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Abstract
Assembly Code Clone Detection for Malware Binaries
Mohammad Reza Farhadi
Malware, such as a virus or trojan horse, refers to software designed speciﬁcally
to gain unauthorized access to a computer system and perform malicious activities.
To analyze a piece of malware, one may employ a reverse engineering approach to
perform an in-depth analysis on the assembly code of a malware. Yet, the reverse
engineering process is tedious and time consuming. One way to speed up the analysis
process is to compare the disassembled malware with some previously analyzed mal-
ware, identify the similar functions in the assembly code, and transfer the comments
from the previously analyzed software to the new malware. The challenge is how to
eﬃciently identify the similar code fragments (i.e., clones) from a large repository of
assembly code.
In this thesis, an assembly code clone detection system is presented. Its per-
formance is evaluated in terms of accuracy, eﬃciency, scalability, and feasibility of
ﬁnding clones on assembly code decompiled from real-life malware binary ﬁles and
some DLL ﬁles from an Operating System. Experimental results suggest that the
proposed clone detection algorithm is eﬀective. This system can be used as the basis
of future development of assembly code clone detection.
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Malware is any kind of software installed in computer systems without the owner’s
adequate consent that performs malicious activities. Malware includes, among oth-
ers, computer viruses, worms, trojan horses, spyware and adware. Their malicious
activities range from simple email spamming to sophisticated distributed denial of
service attacks. New methodologies are used every day to create malware software
that can be hidden from the lens of computer systems protective software.
Reverse engineering, although a time-consuming process, is often the primary
step taken to gain an in-depth understanding of a piece of malware. To achieve a
more eﬃcient analysis, the analyst can manually compare the assembly code with a
repository of previously analyzed assembly code and identify identical or similar code
fragments. By identifying the matched code fragments and transferring the comments
from the previous study to the new assembly code, the analyst can minimize her
redundant eﬀort and put more attention on the new part of the malware. Yet, the
comparison process itself is also time-consuming, and successfully identifying similar
code fragments often depends on the experience and knowledge of the analyst. In
this thesis, an assembly code clone detection system based on the framework proposed
by Sæbjørnsen et. al [50] is presented, and the performance of the system in terms
of accuracy, eﬃciency, scalability, and feasibility of ﬁnding clones on assembly code
decompiled from real-life binary and malware ﬁles is evaluated.
The problem of assembly code clone detection is informally described as follows:
Given a large collection of previously analyzed assembly ﬁles and a speciﬁc target
assembly ﬁle or a piece of target assembly code fragment, a user would like to identify
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all code fragments in the previously analyzed assembly ﬁles that are syntactically or
semantically similar to the target assembly ﬁle or the piece of target assembly code
fragment. The challenges of the problem can be summarized as follows:
Simple keyword matching won’t solve the problem: A simple method to
identify the assembly code clone is to identify some keywords, such as constants,
strings, and imports, in a code fragment, and then attempt to match them in other
code fragments. Another alternative method is to perform a keyword search in RE-
Google [1]. The keyword search capability is essential, yet insuﬃcient, for assembly
code clone detection because many code fragments do not contain any keywords or
unique strings.
Large volume of data: The size of an assembly ﬁle can range from a couple of
kilobytes to over dozens of megabytes of textual data. Depending on the user-speciﬁed
parameters, each assembly ﬁle can be further decomposed into an array of regions
with size proportional to the number of lines of an assembly ﬁle. The eﬃciency of
a clone detection method refers to the period of time required for identifying all the
clones. The scalability of a clone detection method refers to its capability of handling
large collection of assembly code.
Syntactic and semantic clones: Two code fragments that are syntactically
similar to each other are considered to be a syntactic clone. Two code fragments that
perform the same computation but having diﬀerent instructions are considered to be
a semantic clone. Ideally, a clone detection algorithm should able to identify both
types of clones. Yet, semantic clones are diﬃcult to detect, especially in the context
of assembly code.
The objectives of this thesis are (1) to introduce a formal framework for design and
implementation of an assembly code clone detection, (2) to evaluate the feasibility of
detecting exact clones with diﬀerent levels of normalization, (3) to propose an accurate
inexact clone detection, (4) to implement an eﬃcient search capability on constants,
strings, imports and code fragments, which are known to be valuable features for
gaining insight into the binary ﬁles. Finally,
Contributions: The contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows. An
assembly code clone detection framework based on Sæbjørnsen et al.’s work [50] is
developed and signiﬁcant extensions on its normalization and inexact clone detection
method are made. The new normalization process improves the clone detection tool
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by ﬁnding type I and type II clones. Sæbjørnsen et al. [50] presented an inexact clone
detection method to identify clone pairs that are not exactly identical. The general
approach is to ﬁrst extract a set of features from each region and create a feature vector
for each of them. Sæbjørnsen et al. used locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) to ﬁnd the
nearest neighbor vectors of a given query vector. Although this approach shows some
encouraging results to identify clone pairs that were not exactly identical, it has an
inappropriate assumption on the uniform distribution of vectors and the requirement
of specifying precise probabilistic models. As the number of features increase (i.e.,
dimensions), the assumption on the uniform distribution of vectors may not hold.
As a result, their approach may miss the vectors (clones) that are not uniformly
distributed; therefore, increasing the chance of having false negatives. A new approach
to address the issue of false negatives is presented and implemented in this thesis.
This new approach can ﬁnd Type III clones by an eﬃcient feature extraction and
ﬁltering process algorithm. Finally, the framework is improved by storing the clone
results in an XML ﬁle and visualizing the clones. Experimental results on real-life
malware binaries obtained from the National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance
(NCFTA) Canada suggest that our proposed clone detection algorithm is eﬀective.
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a literature review and
background knowledge on source and assembly code clone detection. Chapter 3 for-
mally deﬁnes the problem of assembly code clone detection. Chapter 4 discusses the
implementation details and proposed algorithms used in the implemented assembly
code clone detection tool. Chapter 5 presents the experimental results to illustrate
the performance of the implemented assembly code clone detection system. Chap-
ter 6 concludes the thesis and also suggests the potential extensions that can further
improve the currently implemented system.
3
Chapter 2
Related Work and Background
Knowledge
In this chapter, ﬁrst, the state-of-art techniques for source code fragment matching
are summarized to analyze the feasibility of applying the techniques to assembly
code fragment matching. These techniques are categorized into eight groups. For
each category, the most promising techniques are identiﬁed based on the analysis and
experimental results obtained from diﬀerent literature reviews, survey papers, and
case study papers.
Then, the state-of-art techniques for assembly code fragment matching are sum-
marized and categorized into six groups. The most promising techniques are also
identiﬁed and brieﬂy described.
The procedure of clone detection consists of two phases, transformation and com-
parison. The general idea is to transform the code into an intermediate format that
facilitates more eﬀective and eﬃcient comparison.
Before describing the categorized techniques, the deﬁnition of code clone types
with respect to textual and functional similarities is presented.
Clone Deﬁnition
Any two given similar code fragments can be similar in two diﬀerent ways: textual
and functional similarity. The following deﬁnitions of code clone types are widely
used in the literature of clone detection and plagiarism (Roy et al. [48], [49]).
Textual Similarity :
• Type I: Identical code fragments except for variations in whitespace (perhaps
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also variations in layout) and comments.
• Type II: Structurally/syntactically identical fragments except for variations in
identiﬁers, literals, types, layout, and comments.
• Type III: Copied fragments with further modiﬁcations. Statements can be
changed, added, or removed in addition to variations in identiﬁers, literals,
types, layout, and comments.
Functional Similarity :
• Type IV: Two or more code fragments that perform the same computation that
is implemented through diﬀerent syntactic variants. This type of clone is also
called a semantic clone.
2.1 Matching Source Code Fragment
Text-Based Approach
Text-based clone detectors consider the target source program as a sequence of
lines or strings, and compare every pair of code fragments to ﬁnd identical sequences
of strings. Since the match is based purely on the text of the lexical approach, the
identiﬁed clones often do not correspond to any structural elements of the language.
Most text-based techniques do not transform the source code into some intermedi-
ate or normalized format, except for comments removal, whitespace removal, and
some very basic preprocessing steps [23]. Text-based methods are robust to format
alteration, but fragile to identiﬁer renaming.
Johnson ([32], [33]) presented a pioneer work of a pure text-based approach that
ﬁnds redundancy of code using ﬁngerprints on a substring of the source code. The
general idea of the method is to ﬁrst calculate the signature of each line and then
identify the matched substrings. First, a text-to-text transformation is performed
on the source ﬁle for discarding uninteresting characters. Then, the ﬁle is divided
into a set of substrings so that every character of the text appears in at least one
substring. To compute the ﬁngerprints of all length n substrings of a text, Johnson
employed the Karp-Rabin ﬁngerprinting algorithm [36] . A sliding-window technique
in combination with an incremental hash function is used to identify sequences of lines
having the same hash value as clones. For ﬁnding near-miss clones, his algorithm ﬁnds
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a normalized/transformed text by removing all whitespace characters except for line
separators and by replacing each maximal sequence of alphanumeric characters with
a single letter, such as “a”.
For example, a line
for(k = 1; k ≤ n; k ++)
is transformed to





Marcus and Maletic [46] searched for similarities of high-level concepts extracted
from comments and source code elements. They employed latent semantic indexing
[25] for ﬁnding similar code fragments in the source code. This information retrieval
approach limits the comparison within comments and identiﬁers. Their results show
that high-level, semantic clones can be detected with low computational cost. They
also illustrated that their approach can be combined with other existing clone detec-
tion approaches. One major drawback is that this approach alone cannot detect two
functions with similar structure and functionality if comments do not exist and the
identiﬁers’ names are diﬀerent.
Ji et al. [31] introduced an adaptive local alignment method that considers the
frequencies of keywords in the clone detection scoring function. The basic idea of
adaptive local alignment is that the matching score of keywords should reﬂect the
frequencies of keywords. Speciﬁcally, their method assigns a high score for a keyword
with low frequency, and a low score for a keyword with a high frequency. The rationale
is that it is rare to see keywords of low frequency being used by two fragments at
the same time. Therefore, two programs using the same keywords of low frequency
should be considered similar.
Token-Based Approach
A token-based clone detector parses and transforms source code to a sequence of
tokens using compiler style lexical analysis. All the whitespaces, including line breaks,
tabs, and comments between tokens are removed from the token sequence. A sequence
is then scanned for duplicated subsequences of tokens, and ﬁnally, the original code
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portions representing the duplicated subsequences are returned as clones. Compared
with text-based approaches, a token-based approach is usually more robust against
code changes such as formatting and spacing. Since variables of the same type are
mapped into the same token, a token-based approach is usually more robust against
identiﬁer renaming. However, this approach is generally fragile to statement reorder-
ing and code insertion because it relies on sequential analysis. A reordered or inserted
statement can break a token sequence that may otherwise be regarded as duplicate
to another sequence. Token-based methods are also fragile to control replacement
because, for example, for and while loops render diﬀerent token sequences [44]
Kamiya et al. [34] proposed a multi-language token-based clone detection method
called CCFinder, which extracts code clones in C, C++, Java, COBOL, and other
source ﬁles. First, each line of source ﬁles is parsed into tokens by a lexer and the
tokens of all source ﬁles are then concatenated into a single token sequence. The
token sequence is then transformed based on the transformation rules of the language
of interest, aiming at regularization of identiﬁers and identiﬁcation of structures. For
example,
void print lines(const set 〈string〉&s) {
int c = 0;
set 〈string〉::const iterator i
= s.begin();
for (; i != s.end(); ++i) {
cout << c << ”, ”




is transformed to the following by some transformation rules.
void print lines ( const set & s ) {
int c = 0;
const iterator i
= s . begin ( );
for ( ; i != s . end ( ) ; ++ i ) {
cout << c << ”, ”
7




Then, all identiﬁers of types, variables, and constants are replaced with a special
token, e.g., $p. This identiﬁer replacement makes code fragments with diﬀerent vari-
able names be clone pairs. For example, the above code will become the following
after the replacements of identiﬁers:
$p $p ( $p $p & $p ) {
$p $p = $p ;
$p $p
= $p . $p ( ) ;
$p ( ; $p != $p . $p ( ) ; ++ $p ) {
$p << $p << $p




Burd and Bailey [18] conducted an independent experiment on CCFinder and
found that CCFinder has a precision of 72% and recall of 72%, with a medium system
of 16 KLOC. The recall rate of CCFinder is the best among all the tested methods
in Burd and Bailey’s experiments. Experimental results suggest that CCFinder is
promising for Type I and Type II clone detections for source code.
Baker ([10], [9]) proposed another token-based method calledDup. As in CCFinder,
Baker also used a lexer to tokenize the source code, then compared the tokens of each
line using a suﬃx-tree based algorithm. Transformation rules on the token sequence
were not applied in the work, and the notion of parametrized matching was introduced
by a consistent renaming of the identiﬁers. Dup requires a lot of user interactions to
determine whether tokens are identical. For example, the user may specify the same
token ID to diﬀerent data types, such as int, short, long, ﬂoat, and double, depending
on requirements.
The token-based techniques discussed above (Kamiya et al. [34]; Baker [9], [10])
make use of a suﬃx tree to detect similarities in the token string. Recently, researchers
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have shown that an alternative data called suﬃx arrays (Manber and Myers [45]) can
provide the same eﬃciency for string matching with much reduced space requirements
(Abouelhoda et al. [6]). Another limitation of these token-based techniques is the
separation of parameter and non-parameter tokens, which can potentially cause false
negatives in clone detection.
To address the above shortcomings in a token-based approach, Basit et al. [12]
proposed a method called Repeated Tokens Finder (RTF). They made two contri-
butions to the token-based approach: (1) RTF implements a ﬂexible tokenization
mechanism. (2) They consider the problem of clone detection as ﬁnding repeating
substrings within the combined token string, and making the comparisons feasible by
utilizing suﬃx arrays.
• Flexible tokenization mechanism: First, the language-speciﬁc tokenizer assigns
a unique numeric ID to each token class of the source language, e.g., keywords,
operators, comment markers, etc. Then, a single large token string is generated
from all the source ﬁles. Identical segments of this token string are reported as
clones that can be either exact clones (Type I) or parameterized clones (Type
II) owing to the normalization of certain tokens according to the proposed
tokenization. Next, RTF allows a user to suppress some insigniﬁcant token
classes that may be considered noise in clone detection. For example, access
modiﬁers, such as private, protected, and public, are not important for clone
detection, and therefore should be suppressed. Furthermore, RTF allows a user
to equate diﬀerent token classes. For example, int, short, long, ﬂoat, and double
can be merged into the same ID, so that code fragments that diﬀer only in data
types become a clone pair.
• Finding repeating substrings : RTF treats clone detection as ﬁnding repeating
substrings within a large combined token string. In fact, RTF ﬁnds the non-
extendable repeating substrings because any non-empty subsequence of a clone
is also a clone. Speciﬁcally, RTF applies (the method of Abouelhoda et al. [6])
to the problem of source code clone detection.
Most works on clone detection assume that the source database is static and the
clone detection operation is performed in a batch mode. When the source database
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is updated, the entire detection operation has to be performed again. Most liter-
ature in the ﬁeld implicitly makes such an assumption, regardless of the program
representation they operate on or the search algorithm they employ.
Recently, Hummel et al. [28] proposed a scalable token-based tool called ConQAT
for detecting clones in the environment of an incrementally updated source database.
ConQAT is open source. Its token-based clone detection method is more or less similar
to the previously discussed methods, such as CCFinder and Dup, and ConQAT can
detect Type I and Type II clones. The major contribution of ConQAT is its capability
to eﬃciently identify the clones when updates are performed on the source database,
by maintaining a data structure called clone index. It allows the lookup of all clones
for a single ﬁle (and thus for the entire system), and can be updated eﬃciently when
ﬁles are added, removed, or modiﬁed. For example, adding a new ﬁle may introduce
new clones to any of the previously examined ﬁles and thus a comparison to all ﬁles
is required if no additional data structure is used. The general idea of the clone index
is similar to that of the inverted index used in document-retrieval systems in which
a mapping is maintained between each word and all its occurrences. Similarly, the
clone index maintains a mapping from sequences of normalized statements to their
occurrences.
Tree-Based Approach
In the tree-based approach, the source code is ﬁrst converted into an abstract
syntax tree (AST) or a parse tree using a language-speciﬁc parser. Tree-matching
techniques are then used to ﬁnd similar subtrees, and the corresponding code seg-
ments are returned as clone pairs or clone classes. Variable names and literal values
in the source may be abstracted in the tree representation, allowing for more ﬂexible
detection of clones. In general, tree-based approaches can detect Type I clones. For
Type II clones, the token-based approach is more eﬀective. Since this approach dis-
regards the information about variables (in order to make code diﬀering on variables’
names appear the same on ASTs), it ignores data ﬂow and is consequently fragile to
statement reordering and to control replacement (Liu et al. [44]).
Baxter et al. [13] presented an AST-based clone detection method called CloneDr.
First, a language-speciﬁc parser generates an annotated parse tree. See Figure 1 for
an example
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Figure 1: Annotated Parse Tree (Baxter et al. [13])
The next step is to ﬁnd the subtree clones by comparing every subtree to other
subtrees for equality. Subtrees are compared using characterization metrics based on
a hash function and tree matching. This approach works for detecting Type I clones.
When locating Type II clones, hashing on complete subtrees fails precisely because a
good hashing function includes all elements of the tree and, therefore, considers trees
with minor diﬀerences to be mismatched. Baxter et al. [13] solved the problem by
choosing an artiﬁcially “bad” hash function. This function must be characterized in
such a way that the main properties one wants to ﬁnd on Type II clones are preserved.
Type II clones are usually created by copying and pasting code fragments, followed
by making small modiﬁcations. These modiﬁcations usually generate small changes to
the shape of the tree associated with the copied piece of code. Therefore, they argue
that this kind of Type II clone often has only some diﬀerent small subtrees. Based
on this observation, a hash function that ignores small subtrees is a good choice.
They used a hash function in their experiments that ignores only the identiﬁer names
(leaves in the tree). Thus, their hashing function puts trees that have similar modulo
identiﬁers into the same hash bins for comparison. They further proposed some
threshold-based similarity measures to measure the similarity of two subtrees.
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Wahler et al. [58] proposed a method to ﬁnd Type I and Type II clones at a more
abstract level than an AST. A program AST is converted to an XML representation
and a frequent itemset technique is applied to the XML representation of to ﬁnd
clones. They modiﬁed the frequent itemset technique to ﬁt it to the problem of code
clone detection.
Evans and Fraser [26] proposed a further abstraction, known as structural abstrac-
tion, of a program’s AST for ﬁnding both Type I and Type II clones with gaps. While
ASTs are built from a lexical abstraction of a program by parameterizing only AST
leaves (abstracting identiﬁers and literal values), structural abstraction is obtained
by further parameterizing the arbitrary subtrees of ASTs. For example, x = a[?] lexi-
cally matches x = a[i] because it includes only a leaf and a unary node that identiﬁes
the type of the leaf. x = a[?] also structurally matches x = a[i+1] because it includes
a binary AST node.
Similarity Distance-Based Approach
Brixtel et al. [16] presented a comprehensive similarity distance-based plagiarism
detection framework. In this section, the only elaborated steps are the ones that are
relevant to the problem of code fragments matching, namely normalization, segmen-
tation, and similarity measure. Brixtel et al. do not present a predeﬁned method for
segmentation. A code segment can be a line or a block of code. The distance of two
segments, s1 and s2, is measured by a distance function Dist(s1, s2).
The distance function can be the edit distance, e.g., Hamming or Levenshtein
(Levenshtein [43]), by counting the number of operations (insertions, deletions, and
replacements) required to transform s1 to s2. Another possible distance function is
the information distance, which can be approximated using data compression, e.g.,
gzip. Let c(s) be the compressed version of a segment, and let |c(s)| be the size of
the compressed version. The distance between two segments (or two strings) is:
Dist(s1, s2) = 1 -
|c(s1)|+|c(s2)|−|c(s1,s2)|
max(|c(s1)|,|c(s2)|)
where |c(s1, s2)| denotes the compressed size of the concatenation of s1 and s2.
Refer to (Cilibrasi and Vitanyi [20]) for the details of this formula.
Program Dependency Graph (PDG)-Based Approach
Program Dependency Graph (PDG)-based approaches attempt to identify a higher
abstraction of a source code than the previously discussed approaches by considering
the semantic information of the source code. PDG-based approaches use nodes to
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represent expressions and statements, while the edges represent control and data de-
pendencies. This representation abstracts from the lexical order in which expressions
and statements occur to the extent that they are semantically independent. Intu-
itively, PDGs encode the program logic and in turn reﬂect developers’ thinking when
code is written. The search for clones is then turned into the problem of ﬁnding
isomorphic subgraphs (Roy and Cordy [48]).
Krinke [41] proposed a clone detection method based on ﬁne-grained program de-
pendence graphs. His method, commonly known as Duplix (Roy and Cordy [48]),
considers both the syntactic structure and data ﬂow of a software program. The ﬁrst
step is to transform code fragments into ﬁne-grained PDGs, and the second step is to
identify similar subgraph structures from the PDGs. The vertices of the ﬁne-gained
PDG represent components of expressions. There are three types of edges between
the vertices. Immediate control dependence edges are between the components of an
expression, which are evaluated before the source code is evaluated. Value depen-
dence edges represent the data ﬂow between the expression components. Reference
dependence edges represent the assignment of values to variables.
Komondoor and Horwitz [39] proposed a PDG-based clone detection method
called PDG-DUP. The general idea is to ﬁrst partition all PDG nodes based on
the syntactic structure of the statement/predicate that the node represents. For each
pair of matching nodes (r1, r2), PDG-DUP identiﬁes the isomorphic subgraphs of the
PDG that contains r1 and r2 using backward and forward slicing. The identiﬁed
isomorphic subgraphs are clones.
Liu et al. [44] developed an eﬃcient PDG-based plagiarism detection algorithm
called GPLAG. They employed a relaxed subgraph isomorphism comparison by in-
troducing a relaxation threshold γ . Two subgraphs g and g’ are γ-isomorphic if their
diﬀerence is within the threshold γ. Although subgraph isomorphism comparison is
in general NP-complete, they developed GPLAG based on three observations, mak-
ing GPLAG a feasible real-life application. First, PDGs cannot be arbitrarily large
as procedures are designed to be of reasonable size for developers to manage. Sec-
ond, PDGs are not general graphs and their peculiarity, like varieties of vertex types,
makes backtrack-based isomorphism algorithm eﬃcient. Finally, unlike traditional
isomorphism comparison, a user usually is satisﬁed as long as one, rather than all,
isomorphism between g and g’ is found. A user can look into the details once a pair
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of matched procedures has been identiﬁed. These three factors make isomorphism
comparison eﬃcient in GPLAG.
Liu et al. identiﬁed ﬁve categories of source code alterations and considered their






The ﬁrst and second alteration remove blanks, insert comments, or rename the
identiﬁers in the source code. Hence, these alterations do not alter the PDG because
they do not aﬀect the dependencies of the graph. Statement reordering changes
the location of statements without causing error. This type of alteration also does
not alter the PDG because the statements can be reordered if they do not have
dependencies. Control replacement changes the control ﬂow of the source code. For
example, a for loop can be equivalently replaced by a while loop. This alteration
can add a new program vertex to the subgraphs but does not aﬀect the dependencies
of subgraphs. The last alteration is code insertion, which inserts immaterial code
into the program so that the original program logic does not change. These types
of alterations can introduce new dependencies into the program but they are not
supposed to interfere with existing dependencies.
Let n be the number of procedures in the ﬁrst source code ﬁle andm be the number
of procedures in the second source code ﬁle. To identify the clone pairs, Liu et al.
observed that it is not necessary to perform a full isomorphism comparison for n ∗m
pairs for PDGs. Most PDG pairs can in fact be excluded from detailed isomorphism
testing because they are dissimilar, even with a high-level examination. Therefore,
they proposed a lossy ﬁlter to prune these dissimilar PDG pairs. Unlike conventional
similarity measurement, usually based on a certain distance metric, this ﬁlter follows
a similar reasoning to hypothesis testing: A PDG pair (g, g′) is preserved until
enough evidence is collected against the similarity between g and g′. In comparison
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with distance-based methods, this approach avoids the diﬃculty of proper parameter
setting and also provides a statistical estimation of the false negative rate. Their
experiment shows that GPLAG can eﬃciently prune 90% of the original search space.
Metrics-Based Approach
Most of the previously discussed approaches identify clones by directly comparing
code. In contrast, metrics-based approaches gather diﬀerent metrics for code frag-
ments and compare the metrics vectors. There are several clone detection techniques
that use various software metrics for detecting similar code. First, a set of software
metrics called ﬁngerprinting functions are calculated for a class, a function, a method
or even a statement, and then the metrics values are compared to ﬁnd clones over
these syntactic units. In most cases, the source code is parsed to its AST/PDG
representation for calculating such metrics.
Kontogiannis et al. [40] proposed two approaches to detect clones. The ﬁrst
approach is named direct comparison of metrics values that classiﬁes a code fragment
in the granularity of begin-end blocks. Two code fragments are considered similar if
their corresponding metrics values are close. The second approach uses a dynamic
programming technique for comparing begin-end blocks at the statement level.
Program features relevant for clone detection focus on data and control ﬂow prop-
erties. Kontogiannis et al. used the following metrics:
1. The number of functions called (fanout).
2. The ratio of input/output variables to the fanout.
3. McCabe cyclomatic complexity.
4. Modiﬁed Albrecht’s function point metric. And,
5. Modiﬁed Henry-Kafura’s information ﬂow quality metric.
Let s be a code fragment.
McCabe(s) = e - n + 2,
where e is the number of edges in the control ﬂow graph, and n is the number of
nodes in the graph.
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Albrecht(s) = p1 ∗ VARS USED AND SET(s)+
p2 ∗ GLOBAL VARS SET(s)+
p3 ∗ USER INPUT(s)+
p4 ∗ FILE INPUT(s)
where p1, p2, p3 and p4 are weight factors.
Karfura(s) = (Kafura in(s) ∗ Kafura out(s))2,
where Karfura in(s) is the sum of local and global incoming dataﬂow to the code
fragment s, and Karfura out(s) is the sum of local and global outgoing dataﬂow to
the code fragment s.
Mayrand et al. [47] proposed a method called CLAN that calculates 21 functional
metrics, e.g., number of lines of source, number of function calls contained, and
number of CFG edges, for each function unit of a program. Units with the similar
metrics values are identiﬁed as code clones. Partly-similar units are not detected. It
uses a representation of the source code called Intermediate Representation Language
(IRL) to characterize each function in the source code. For example, Figure 2 depicts
the IRL representation of the following function:
int fct (int param) {
int ret = 0;









Metrics are calculated from names, layouts, expressions, and control ﬂows of func-
tions. A clone is deﬁned only as a pair of whole function bodies that have similar
metric values. This approach does not detect clones at other granularity levels such as
segment-based clones, which occur more frequently than function-based clones. Very
similar kinds of method-level metrics, such as the number of calls from a method,
number of statements, McCabe’s cyclomatic complexity, number of use-deﬁnition of
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non-local variables, and number of local variables, are features for identifying similar
methods.
Figure 2: IRL Representation of the Sample code (Mayrand et al. [47])
Shawky and Ali [55] performed experiments on other metrics values: (1) the num-
ber of inputs a function uses (2) the number of outputs (3) the number of declarative
and executable statements (4) the average number of lines containing source for all
nested functions (5) the number of edges, nodes, and connected components, and (6)
the maximum nesting level of control constructs in a function.
Memory-Based Approach
Memory-based clone detection is a recently proposed approach by Kim et al. [38].
Unlike most of the previously described approaches that are based on textual or struc-
tural similarity, the proposed Memory Comparison-based Clone Dectector (MeCC)
identiﬁes clones by comparing programs’ abstract memory states, which are computed
by a semantic-based static analyzer. The primary objective is to detect gapped clones
(Type III) and semantic clones (Type IV). The clone detection ability of MeCC is
independent of the syntactic similarity of clone candidates. MeCC has two phases:
(1)its uses a path-sensitive semantic-based static analyzer to estimate the memory
states at each procedure’s exit point, and (2) compares the memory states to identify
clones. Figure 3 shows an overview of MeCC.
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Figure 3: Overview of MeCC (Kim et al., [38])
Figure 4: Example of Abstract Memory State (Kim et al. [38])
Figure 4 shows the abstract memory states of the sample programs foo and bar.
The joined memory state at the return point of foo (line 6) is shown as the table in
Figure 4.
Figure 5: Example of Abstract Memory State Comparison (Kim et al. [38])
Figure 5 shows another procedure called foo2, which is a semantic clone of proce-
dure foo in Figure 4. Ignoring the names of variables, symbols, ﬁeld variables, and
variable types, MeCC can determine that β ≤ 5 ∨ γ ≤ 0 and β ≤ 5 ∨ (β > 5 ∧
γ ≤ 0) are in fact equivalent and therefore, the two fragments are clones.
Hybrid Approach
Diﬀerent approaches have diﬀerent strengths and weaknesses. The idea of the hy-
brid approach is to use diﬀerent approaches with the goal of combining their strengths
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and avoiding their weaknesses. In this section, some papers that combine token-based
or text-based approaches with tree-based or PDG-based approaches are reviewed to
get the beneﬁcial aspects of multiple approaches. This work can lead to analyzing
large scale source codes and software with better precision. Also, it can increase the
portability of syntactic and semantic approaches to assembly code clone detection.
Balazinska et al. [11] proposed a hybrid approach of characterization metrics
and DPM (Dynamic Pattern Matching). Their paper discusses only the detection of
whole methods, although the approach may also be applied to detect partial code
fragments. Characteristic metrics valued are computed for each of the method bodies
and compared to ﬁnd clusters of similar methods. The token sequences for each pair
of similar methods are then compared by the Dynamic Pattern Matching Algorithm
of Kontogiannis et al., in order to identify cloned methods. Finally, the found cloned
methods are classiﬁed into 18 categories.
Tairas et al. [56] developed a plug-in for the Microsoft Phoenix framework for
automatic clone detection. They used AST nodes to generate a suﬃx tree, allowing
analysis on the nodes. A path is made from the root to a leaf for each suﬃx of a
string. This is done by evaluating each character in the suﬃx and generating new
edges when there are no existing edges that represent the character in the suﬃx tree.
A suﬃx tree is useful in string matching because duplicate patterns in the suﬃxes
will be represented by a single edge in the tree.
Figure 6: “abcdabe$”’s Suﬃx Tree (Tairas et al. [56])
Figure 6 depicts the suﬃx tree for the string “abcdabe$”. The non-empty suﬃxes










The pattern ab is represented by a single edge. Two suﬃxes abcdabe$ and abe$
pass through this edge. The split at the end of this edge continues the two suﬃxes
where the next character diﬀers between them. By looking at the suﬃxes passing
through the edge that represents the pattern ab, the location of this string pattern
can be determined. Using the method for searching for certain edges in the suﬃx
tree, duplicated functions can be determined.
Zeidman ([61], [62]) published two similar patents for detecting plagiarism in
source code at the ﬁle level. His invention fully compares the features of each pair of
source code. Each source ﬁle is represented by three arrays: an array of source lines,
an array of comment lines, and an array of identiﬁers. His methodology employs
ﬁve measures to identify clones: source line matching, comment line matching, word
matching, partial word matching, and semantic sequence matching. Figure 7 illus-
trates the array of source lines, the array of comment lines, and the array of unique
identiﬁers of the function named fdiv. Zeidman provided an equation for each of the
ﬁve measures and the similarity of two source ﬁles is the weighted sum of the ﬁve
measures.
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Figure 7: Arrays of Source Lines, Comment Lines, and Unique Identiﬁers (Zeidman
[61])
Davis and Godfrey [22] proposed a novel technique to detect clones by analyzing
the assembly-version of source code. Their work complements token- and text-based
techniques for source code clone detection. First, the source code is normalized and is
reduced to a sequence of simple operations. Then, it is compiled into assembly code.
The comparison is performed on assembly instructions in functions. A search-based
approach is used to ﬁnd maximal pairings of distinct matched assembly code instruc-
tions from two distinct assembly subsequences that occur in the same sequence. The
search-based algorithm examines each instruction by walking through each function
and each array of instructions within a function. Given two sequences of comparable
instructions P and Q, the comparison process compares every pair of instructions
in P and Q, assigns a positive weight to each matched pair, and assigns a negative
weight for each unmatched pair. Consequently, the subsequences with high sum of
weights are considered to be clones.
Keivanloo et al. [37] proposed a hybrid approach to improve the scalability of the
current existing clone detection tools. They devise a divide-and-conquer algorithm
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that splits a given data set into n random subsets and extracts clones from each
subset independently. The drawback is that the algorithm will miss the clone pairs
that span across two diﬀerent subsets. Their algorithm provides a trade-oﬀ between
recall and scalability.
2.2 Matching Assembly Code Fragments
Text-Based Approach
A text-based approach in binary clone detection considers the executable portion
of a binary as a sequence of bytes or lines of assembly code and compares every pair
of code segments to ﬁnd identical sequences.
Jang et al. ([29], [30]) proposed a ﬁngerprinting algorithm called BitShred based
on bloom ﬁlters to cluster malware samples. In addition, they stated that BitShred
can be used to detect software bugs resulting from copied code. However, they did
not have any success in their experiments.
BitShred consists of three phases: shredding a ﬁle, creating a ﬁngerprint, and
comparing ﬁngerprints. In the shredding phase, BitShred divides all executable code
sections into fragments called shreds (i.e., n-grams). Figure 8 shows an example of
shredding a byte sequence with n= 5.
Figure 8: Shredding a Byte Sequence with n = 5 (Jang and Brumley, [29])
Next, to improve storage eﬃciency and scalability, BitShred uses a Bloom ﬁlter
(Bloom, [14]) created from all shreds of a given ﬁle to represent the ﬁngerprint of
the ﬁle. Then, BitShred calculates similarity between two ﬁngerprints by using the
Jaccard index, which is deﬁned as the size of the intersection divided by the size of the






where S(BF) is the total bits set in the Bloom ﬁlter BF.
Finally, ﬁles having a similarity score higher than a threshold t can be clustered
together. Clustering is performed in two steps: ﬁrst, malware samples with similarity
equal to 1 are clustered. Similarity between every pair of the remaining samples is
then calculated.
Token-Based Approach
Token-based binary clone detectors disassemble executable code segments and
partition lines of assembly into opcodes and operands. Opcode and operand types
may be generalized or ﬁltered and the resulting sequence is scanned to ﬁnd duplicates.
Schulman ([52], [53], [54]) whitelists “boilerplate” code in binaries to be analyzed
for litigation purposes. To address this, he designed a system to create a database of
previously analyzed binaries to recognize duplicate functions. This appears to be the
ﬁrst work on detecting code clones at the functional level. In addition, this work was
designed to handle a large volume of assembly code.
The basic idea of the system is to create a hash of each function in the binary being
analyzed and to store it in the database. Identical hash values that occur in more
than one binary indicate a code clone. This approach will detect some functions
whose source code is identical, but will miss many others. Compiling source code
does not always produce an identical assembly each time. Stack memory addresses
may change, depending on the functions position in the binary. In addition, the
binary may be compiled as Unicode versus ASCII, resulting in diﬀerent assembly
instructions. The source code may also have modiﬁcations such as diﬀerent hard
coded values in its variables, even though prior to this modiﬁcations the source was
identical. To address these changes in the resulting assembly, the author normalizes
the instructions in the following manner:
1. Only the opcode, not the operands, are used in the hash.
2. Opcodes are converted to their mnemonics. For example opcodes 51 and 52
are instructions for push ecx and push edx. The hash is now performed on the
resulting generic opstring push instead of their numeric counterparts.
3. Location labels are added to the opstring as loc to add structure information
for a more accurate hash.
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4. Windows API calls are included in a normalized format (again, wide vs. ASCII
formats are ignored).
5. Commonly occurring mnemonics such as mov, pop and push are ignored to
further handle minor code changes.
An example of the resulting opstring for a function is:
loc,[MessageBox],cmp,jnz,ret
This string is hashed and stored in the database.
Karim et al. [35] addressed the problem of classifying new malware into existing
malware families whose individual entries share common code. Their goal has been
to create phylogeny models of malware based on features of their binary code, such as
biologists create phylogeny models based on nucleotide, protein, and gene sequences
of organisms. They built the models to handle program evolution through code
rearrangements (instruction or block reordering). They experimented with an n-gram
comparison approach as well as its permutations, which they refer to as n-perms. They
argueed that permutations could include instruction, block, or subroutine reordering.
In such situations, the reordering can make sequence-sensitive techniques, such as
n-gram, produce undesirable results if they report similarity scores that are too low
for reordered variants or descendants. Experiments were performed on artiﬁcially
constructed permutations of worms as well as unrelated samples. This work evaluates
the use of n-grams versus n-perms for clustering malware samples into their respective
families.
The ﬁrst step is to use the tokenizer to transform an input program into a sequence
of opcodes. Next, n-grams and n-perms are extracted from this sequence. An n-perm
would simply be an ordered n-gram. Subsequently, they create a feature occurrence
matrix with entries i, j that refer to the number of times a feature (i.e., a speciﬁc
n-gram or n-perm) occurs in program j. Then, they create a symmetric similarity
matrix where each i, j entry is the calculated similarity between programs i and j.
Similarity is calculated by using the tf ∗ idf weighting (van Rijsbergen, [57]) and
cosine similarity measure (Zobel and Moﬀat, [63]). This method makes features that
are common among many programs weighted lower and those features common within
a program weighted higher.
tokenizer → feature occurrence matrix extractor → similarity metric calculator
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Walenstein et al. [59] presented a mechanism called Vilo to search a database
of previously analyzed malware binaries using a new malware sample as the search
string. They adapted techniques from their previous work (Karim et al., [35]) to
perform the similarity matching for the search.
In the Vilo method, whole programs are compared using “n-grams” and “n-perms”
extracted from disassembled binaries that have been unpacked and unencrypted.
They used a vector model for comparison. These extracted features are counted,
weighted, and converted into vectors that are then compared using their cosine simi-
larity measure (Zobel and Moﬀat, [63]). To perform a search using the Vilo method,
a new sample is compared to each existing feature vector in the database.
Metrics-Based Approach
Sæbjørnsen et al. [50] presented a general clone detection framework that operates
on binaries. It utilizes an existing tree similarity framework, models the assembly
instruction sequences as vectors, and groups similar vectors together using existing
“nearest neighbor” algorithms.
They ﬁrst disassemble the input binaries by using a disassembler, such as IDA
Pro [2], and then create intermediate representations of the assembly code. Then,
a binary is partitioned into overlapping code segments that consist of a block of
contiguous assembly extracted from within a function. These regions are created
using a sliding window. Their method then creates a normalized instruction sequence,
abstracting the information of memory location and registers. Next, it performs
clone detection on the normalized structure sequence. They deﬁne two methods for
creating clone clusters. The ﬁrst method is an exact match that uses a hash for each
code region, and a clone exists if there are any repeated hash values. The second
method is an inexact match, which extracts a set of features from a code region and
looks for other code regions with the same feature set. They count the number of
occurrences of each feature to create a feature vector for each region. Next, they use
locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) (Andoni and Indyk, [7]) on each region and perform
a distance calculation for clustering based on features for inexact matching.
Sæbjørnsen et al. utilized IDA Pro for disassembling the code. However, the rest
of the implementation has no reliance on it. After the disassembly, the instructions
are put into the ROSE intermediate representation (Schordan and Quinlan, [51]).
The normalized code regions and feature vectors are then extracted and stored in a
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SQLite database. Finally, both the exact or inexact match detectors run on top of
the database.
Bruschi et al. [17] presented a technique to normalize assembly code to detect
polymorphic and metamorphic malware. The main objective of this work is based on
using a normalization technique to ease the comparison between malware samples.
The authors developed a prototype implementation on top of Boomerang, an open
source decompiler. The normalization is the process of transforming a piece of code
into a canonical form. Bruschi et al. used the following normalization techniques:
• Instruction meta-representation: This is a high-level representation of machine
instructions that mimics the semantics of assembly language (opcode, registers,
memory address, and ﬂags).
• Propagation: It is used to propagate forward values assigned or computed by
intermediate instruction. Once an instruction deﬁnes a value, this variable is
used by subsequent instructions without being redeﬁned. The purpose is to
generate high level expressions and to eliminate all temporary variables. The
following list illustrates a propagation of values in high-level representation of
assembly code:
• Dead code elimination: This technique consists of removing instructions that
are never used.
• Algebraic simpliﬁcation: It simpliﬁes arithmetical and logical operations.
• Control ﬂow graph compression: A control ﬂow can be heavily modiﬁed by
inserting fake conditional and unconditional jumps. As a result, its compression
is necessary to ease browsing and analysis.
Bruschi et al. stated that it is not possible to compare samples by matching byte
by byte in their formalized form. They adopted a method to measure the similarity
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Metrics
m1: number of nodes in the control ﬂow graph.
m2: number of edges in the control ﬂow graph.
m3: number of direct calls.
m4: number of indirect calls.
m5: number of direct jumps.
m6: number of indirect jumps.
m7: number of conditional jumps.
Table 1: Metrics (Bruschi et al [17])
between diﬀerent pieces of code. The method was introduced by (Kontogiannis et al.
[40]). A code is characterized by a vector of metrics’ values and a measure of distance
between diﬀerent code fragments. Table 1 shows the metrics employed by Bruschi et
al.
These metrics identify the ﬁngerprint of a code fragment as a 7-tuple (m1, m2,
m3, m4, m5, m6, m7). The ﬁngerprint is used for code fragments comparison. For the
code fragments “a” and “b”, the comparison is represented by the Euclidean distance:√∑
(mi,a −mi,b)2 for i = 0 . . . 7, where mi,a and mi,b are the ith metrics calculated on
code fragments “a” and “b”.
Structural-Based Approach
In software engineering, a program is considered as a set of components or code
blocks that are built to achieve computational tasks within computers and calculators.
A program consists of a set of instructions written in high- or low-level languages and
structured within blocks. The structural analysis of software is a process that is used
to characterize the execution schema of a program. Furthermore, it allows retrieval of
code information by browsing diﬀerent parts of the code. The structural analysis can
be used to detect bugs within programs and to make comparisons between programs.
In this thesis, the second issue is of primary interest. Diﬀerent structural analysis
techniques for code similarity detection will be discussed in this section, as well as
some works that are related to the detection based on structural analysis approach.
Dullien et al. [24] presented the results of research on executable code compar-
ison for attacker correlation. They implemented a system that can identify code
similarities in executable ﬁles. Dullien et al. based their approach on the struc-
tural comparison of executable ﬁles. The goal of the system is twofold: querying
for a particular feature within malicious code and recognizing similarities between
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diﬀerent malicious pieces of code. In order to query a large set of data, the authors
implemented a function that hashes diﬀerent control ﬂow graphs. Speciﬁcally, they
converted the set of edges in a control ﬂow graph into a set of n-tuples of integers.
A suitable encoding of each set is then constructed as follows: Let M be the set of
all control ﬂow graphs and Eg be the set of edges of a particular G belonging to M .
The graph is represented with the following function:
This function outputs a set of integers that represents a given graph in a simple











to convert integer tuples into a real number:













where t ∈ tup(g)
Dullien et al. developed a matching algorithm based on the approximation to
maximum sub-graph isomorphism problem. The algorithm attempts to map between
nodes and edges by observing a list of characteristics:
• Byte hash: a traditional hash over the bytes of the function or a basic block
• MD-index of a particular function
• MD-index of source and destination of call-graph edges
• MD-index of graph neighborhood of a node/edge (a sub-graph that is originated
from a given node or edge)
• Small prime product: a simple way to compute a hash of mnemonics sequence.
This method ignores compiler-induced reordering of instructions.
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Figure 9: System Architecture (Dullien et al. [24])
Figure 9 shows the architecture of the system, where diﬀerent components fetch
data to perform desired computations. The system consists of four components:
• Unpacker is an unpacking component that removes encryption and obfuscation.
The system monitors the statistical properties of the memory. Once the memory
pages drops, the components assume that encryption/compression was removed.
It writes memory dumps into the database.
• Disassembly extracts the control ﬂow graphs and call-graphs.
• Scheduler performs a rough comparison based on MD-indices of functions in dis-
assembly. It reduces the number of functions and blocks, which are susceptible
to be compared with analyzed chunks of a given binary.
• Comparison component performs the comparison algorithm by querying the
database. It writes the result of comparison back to the database.
Carrera and Erdlyi [19] addressed the challenge of having a large number of mal-
ware samples. They developed a system based on graph theory to rapidly and au-
tomatically analyze and classify malware based on its underlying code structure.
This work is the predecessor to (Briones and Gomez, [15])’s and shares much in
common with its underlying theory and implementation. After IDA Pro is used to
disassemble a binary, their tool exports a subset of the information into the Re-
verse Engineering Markup Language (REML). Carrera has continued with his work
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on this tool and produced http://dkbza.org/idb2reml.html. Using this tool, they use
http://dkbza.org/pyreml.html to create a pythonic representation of the data that can
be queried during the comparison.
They used operating system and library calls in creating their adjacency matrices.
Here their work diﬀers from (Briones and Gomez, [15]) who also used functions that
had similar CFG features. However, after their algorithm exhausts matches, they do
apply CFG signatures similar to the other paper.
Briones and Gomez, [15] designed an automated classiﬁcation system for binaries
with a similar internal structure. They used graph theory to identify similar functions
that are used to classify malware samples. Their objective is to classify new samples
to previously analyzed malware families, thus reducing reverse engineering eﬀorts.
Although their objective is diﬀerent from the problem of matching code fragment
studied in this thesis, the way they identify similar functions is relevant.
The input for their comparison algorithm is an unpacked binary disassembled
with IDA Pro. The next step is to model binaries into adjacency matrices. For
example, in Figure 10, each directed edge represents one function calling another and
can be modeled as the following adjacency matrix. The rows represent the calling
functions and the columns the called functions. To build these adjacency matrices,
the algorithm identiﬁes ﬁxed points that consist of known API calls, function hashes,
and function call graphs (CFGs).
Figure 10: Directed Graph and Adjacency Matrix (Briones and Gomez, [15])
To compare two binaries, their method creates an adjacency matrix for each binary
using identiﬁed ﬁxed points as the columns and unidentiﬁed functions as the rows.
These initial adjacency matrices have identical columns. They determine known API
calls as those identiﬁed by IDA Pro that are shared between the binaries. The function
hashes are unique CRC32 hashes shared between the binaries. Finally, the functions
CFGs are those that have a unique tuple with a minimum Euclidean distance. A tuple
for a CFG consists of a number of basic blocks, a number of edges, and a number of
subcalls.
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The comparison algorithm, from each matrix, searches for the functions that have
identical column entries and are unique in their respective matrices. These identical
functions are removed from their matrices and are added as a column to both matrices.
This process continues until no more matches are found. The remaining rows are
unidentiﬁed functions with no match or functions that do not have a unique match.
Their method can potentially match more functions by adding further ﬁxed points
that initially were not unique and by starting the match process over again. They
deﬁned similarity as a ratio of matched functions to total functions, where 0 indicates
no matches and 1 indicates a complete match.
Implementation: Graph comparison on binaries is a computationally intensive pro-
cess. In their implementation, they suggested some techniques to improve eﬃciency.
First, they did not rely on IDA Pro for disassembly for eﬃciency reasons. Second,
when comparing rows they ﬁrst split the row into blocks of 32 bits for comparison.
They applied ﬁltering when analyzing new samples to reduce the number of com-
parisons. They ﬁltered on ﬁle size, compiler type, number of API functions, number
of custom functions, and entropy and checksum.
Flake [27] presented a method that constructs an isomorphism between the groups
of functions that are used into two diﬀerent versions of the same binary. He deﬁned
a graph centric analysis. This technique consists of representing an executable as a
graph of graphs. The global structure is represented with a call graph, where each
function represents a node. An edge exists between two function nodes fi and fj
if and only if fi calls fj. Every function is represented with a Control Flow Graph
(CFG). The CFG must have the following properties: a unique entry point and one
or many nodes as an exit point (nodes that do not link to other nodes). In this work,
the notion of structural matching is deﬁned. It lies in matching the functions in two
executable ﬁles by using the information generated from the call graph and diﬀerent
control ﬂow graphs. In order to achieve the matching between two versions of the
same executable, namely A and B, Flake considered a formal representation for each
version. A program is formalized as follows:
A = {{a1, a2 . . . an}, {ae1, ae2 . . . aem}}
B = {{b1, b2 . . . bl}, {be1, be2 . . . bek}}
The program is represented by the nodes and their edges (aei and b
e
i are 2-tuple
containing two nodes that are directly connected). Flake based his work on ﬁnding
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iterative mappings between node sets. The iterative mapping is used due to the fact
that the cardinality of the two sets is likely diﬀerent. Each mapping considers two
diﬀerent subsets with the same cardinality. An initial mapping is created. It maps
elements of a subset A1{a1, a2 . . . an} to B1{b1, b2 . . . bl}. This mapping is used to
create iteratively a sequence of mappings.
In order to compare the control ﬂow graphs, Flake considered a heuristic matching
method. The initial step consists of ﬁnding isomorphism between two graphs. Once
that is done, a 3-tuple (αi, βi, γi) is associated with each node: αi represents the
number of basic control blocks, βi is the number of edges within a node, and γi is the
number of edges originating from the node. The mapping is denoted by a function
that maps a call graph to 3-tuple. The function is represented as follows:
s : C → N3
The inverse function is as follows:
s−1 : N3 → ϕ({c1, . . . , co})
This function retrieves the set of functions that map to a 3-tuple. The initial map-
ping is constructed by examining all 3-tuples that are generated from both program
versions A and B. The functions ai from A and bj from B are mapped to each other
if and only if they map the same 3-tuple and no other element in {a1, a2, . . . , an} or
{b1, b2, . . . , bl}. The mapping is formalized as follows:
p1(ai) = bj ⇔ |s−1(s(ai))| = 1 = |s−1(s(bj))| ∧ s(ai) = s(bj)
If the cardinalities of s−1(s(ai)) and s−1(s(bj)) are equal to one and ai and bj have
the same tuple, p1 maps ai and bj. Once the initial mapping is retrieved, improved
mappings pi are built iteratively by creating small subsets. The algorithm to generate
mappings is as follows:
• Take the ith element ai from Ai−1 and retrieve pi−1(ai)
• Let A′i be the set of all functions ak that have edges originating from ai leading
to ak in ϕ and B
′
i be the set of all functions bo that have edges originating from
pi−1(ai) leading to bo in ϕ.
• Construct p′i : A′i → B′i in the same way p1 was constructed
• pi(aj) := pi−1(aj) if aj ∈ Ai−1. If aj /∈ Ai−1 and the construction of p′i yielded
a match, pi(aj) := p
′
i(aj). If the construction of p
′
i did not yield a match and
aj /∈ Ai−1 then pi(aj) is undeﬁned.
32
• Ai and Bi are the domain and image of pi. The iteration carries on until all the
nodes are browsed.
An implementation of the described method was developed as a plug-in for IDA
Pro. A corroborated investigation has shown that the author is involved in the
creation of the BinDiﬀ tool.
BinDiﬀ [3] is a tool that can compare binary ﬁles. It helps researchers ﬁnd dif-
ferences and similarities in disassembled code. It can also port symbols, comments,
functions, and local names between disassembled code. BinDiﬀ can be used to gather
evidences for code theft or patent infringement. The following ﬁgure shows a screen-
shot of BinDiﬀ. It shows the changed functions.
Based on the idea of BinDiﬀ, VxClass [4] can also be used to compare disassembly
code. VxClass can ignore byte-level changes such as instruction reordering or string
obfuscation so that it can discover small changes in the code. The user can upload a
sample of malware in a speciﬁc database. First, VxClass ﬁlters the sample malware
by sorting out items the user already analyzed. Then, it ﬁnds out if that security
incident under investigation is related to any previously analyzed item(s). Next,
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it automatically removes the executable crypters from the code. Finally, VxClass
compares the uploaded executable to the database of stored malware, and informs
the user whether or not the binary is related to a piece of known malware.
Kruegel et al. [42] proposed a novel structural analysis technique to compare worm
structures. This technique is based on comparison of colored graphs to characterize a
worm’s structure. The contributions of the paper are twofold: (1) The description of
a ﬁngerprinting technique based on CFG to detect similarities between variations of
worms. (2) The ﬁngerprinting technique is improved by a coloring scheme. The au-
thors evaluated their prototype system to detect polymorphic worms. In this system,
the authors claim that their technique can be adapted to network intrusion systems.
Anju et al. [8] proposed a method for malware detection based on control ﬂow
graph optimization. They claim that malware identiﬁcation lies in syntactic as well as
semantic features in binaries. They deﬁned architecture for detecting malicious pat-
terns in executable ﬁles. The architecture is broken into two components: Database
Management and Program Analysis. Both components are based on disassembling
executable binaries, optimizing assembly code, extracting the control ﬂow graph, and
optimizing the control ﬂow graph.
Behavioral-Based Approach
Comparetti et al. [21] developed a system called REANIMATOR that allows the
identiﬁcation of dormant functionalities in malware. They exploit the fact that a dy-
namic malware analysis captures malware execution and reports its behavior. Their
basic idea is to run a large set of malware in a sandbox environment and identify
dynamically diﬀerent malware functionalities. Once they are identiﬁed, the function-
alities can be detected within new malware. The REANIMATOR system consists
of three phases. The ﬁrst two phases are responsible for generating a functionality-
aware model for diﬀerent behaviors. The last phase uses constructed models to check
dormant behaviors.
Hybrid Approach
Wang et al. [60] presented a tool called BMAT that creates mappings between old
and new versions of binaries. This tool is used to generate proﬁle information for real-
world applications and to illustrate how to propagate stale proﬁles from an old version
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First, an informal description of the assembly code clone detection problem is pro-
vided. Then, a formal problem description and an example are followed.
The problem of assembly code clone detection is informally described as follows:
Given a large collection of previously analyzed assembly ﬁles and a speciﬁc target as-
sembly ﬁle or a piece of target assembly code fragment, a user would like to identify all
code fragments in the previously assembly ﬁles that are syntactically or semantically
similar to the target assembly ﬁle or the piece of target assembly code fragment.
Let A = {A1, . . . , An} be a collection of previously analyzed assembly ﬁles, where
each assembly ﬁle Af consists of m lines of assembly code, denoted by f [1 : m]. In
the rest of this section, the assembly code has been assumed to be normalized, and
the normalization process will be given in Section 4.1.3. A code fragment f [a : b] in
an assembly ﬁle Ai refers to a subsequence of assembly code from line a to line b in
Ai inclusively, where 1 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ m. Let |f [a : b]| denote the number of lines of
assembly code in f [a : b].
Two notions of clones are deﬁned as follows. Intuitively, two code fragments are
an exact clone pair if they have the same number of lines of assembly code and the
same sequence of assembly code. Two code fragments that share similar instructions
with respect to the mnemonics and operands are considered as an inexact clone pair.
Deﬁnition 3.0.1 (Exact clone) Let f [a : b] and f [c : d] be two arbitrary non-
empty code fragments in A. f [a : b] and f [c : d] are an exact clone pair if |f [a :
b]| = |f [c : d]| and f [a] = f [c], . . . , f [b] = f [d]. The relation = denotes that two code
fragments are identical with respect to the sequence of mnemonics and operands
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appeared in the line of assembly code instruction.
Deﬁnition 3.0.2 (Inexact clone) Let f [a : b] and f [c : d] be two arbitrary non-
empty code fragments in A. Let sim(f [a : b], f [c : d]) be a function that measures the
similarity between two code fragments f [a : b] and f [c : d]. f [a : b] and f [c : d] are
an inexact clone pair if sim(f [a : b], f [c : d]) ≥ minS, where minS is a user-speciﬁed
minimum similarity threshold 0 ≤ minS ≤ 1.
Note that an exact clone pair has sim(f [a : b], f [c : d]) = 1. In other words,
an exact clone pair is also an inexact clone pair with similarity equal to 1. Given a
similarity threshold minS, the inexact clone detection process will also identify all
exact clones. Thus, at ﬁrst glance, the two notions of clones can be merged into one,
and it seems to be unnecessary to develop two diﬀerent clone detection processes for
identifying exact and inexact clones separately. However, in real-life malware analysis,
a reverse engineer sometimes wants to eﬃciently identify only the exact clones. The
problem of assembly code clone detection is to identify all exact and inexact clones in
a given collection of assembly code ﬁles A.
Figure 11: Procedure sub 76641161
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Figure 12: Procedure sub 7664133B
Example 1 Suppose the collection of assembly code A contains only two procedures
as shown in Figures 11 and 12. The code fragment f [25, 31] in sub 76641161 and
the code fragment f [51, 57] in sub 7664133B are an exact clone pair. Also, the code
fragment f [30, 36] in sub 76641161 and the code fragment f [56, 62] in sub 7664133B
are an inexact clone pair.
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Chapter 4
The Clone Detection System
The proposed clone detection system consists of ﬁve major components, namely pre-
processor, clone region detector, clone merger, clone database, and clone visualizer.
Figure 13 provides an overview of the implemented components. The pre-processor
ﬁrst disassembles a collection of binary ﬁles into assembly ﬁles. The clone region
detector parses procedures in the assembly ﬁles, partitions each function into a se-
quence of regions, and identiﬁes the clones among the regions. The output of the
clone region detector is a collection of clone regions. Clone merger then merges the
smaller clone regions into larger size clones. Then, the resulting clones are stored into
a database, which is an XML ﬁle in our current implementation. Finally, the clone
visualizer takes the XML ﬁle as input and interactively shows the clones to the user.
A detailed description of each component is given below.
4.1 Pre-Processing
The pre-processor involves disassembling the binary code into assembly code, index-
ing the tokens from assembly code, and normalizing the assembly code for clone
comparison.
4.1.1 Disassembler
This step disassembles the input binary ﬁles into assembly ﬁles A by using a disas-






























Figure 13: System Architecture
Each function contains a sequence of assembly instructions and each assembly in-
struction consists of a mnemonic and a sequence of operands. Mnemonics are used to
represent the low-level machine operations. The operands can be classiﬁed into three
categories, namely memory reference, register reference and constant values.
4.1.2 Token Indexer
In malware analysis, in addition to the ordinary clone detection process, a reverse
engineer often wants to search for a speciﬁc token, such as a speciﬁc constant value.
The objective of the token indexer is to parse the raw assembly ﬁles and create indexes
for constants, strings, and imports, with the goal of facilitating direct access to the
tokens. Speciﬁcally, the token indexer references tokens by their ﬁlenames and line
numbers. These indexes are then stored into a user-speciﬁed XML ﬁle. See the XML
ﬁle in Section 4.4 as an example. Figure 14 shows the search results on a string token
“RpcTransServerFreeBuﬀer”.
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Figure 14: Search Capability (Search for String “RpcTransServerFreeBuﬀer”)
4.1.3 Normalizer
Two code fragments may be considered as an exact clone even if some of their operands
are diﬀerent. For example, two instructions can be identical even if one uses the
register eax and the other, ebx. Thus, it is essential that the assembly code is
normalized before the comparison.
The objective of the normalizer is to generalize the memory references, registers,
and constant values to an appropriate level chosen by the user. For constant values,
the user has the ﬂexibility to generalize them to V ALx, where x is an index number, or
to V AL, which simply ignores the exact constant value. . For memory references, the
user has the ﬂexibility to generalize them to MEMx, where x is an index number,
or MEM , which simply ignores the speciﬁc memory reference. For registers, the
user has the ﬂexibility to generalize them according to the normalization hierarchy
depicted in Figure 15. The top-most level REG generalizes all registers disregarding
their type. The next level diﬀerentiates between General Registers (e.g., EAX, EBX),
Segment Registers (e.g., CS, DS), as well as Index and Pointer Registers (e.g., ESI,
EDI). The third level breaks down the General Registers into 3 groups by size, namely
32-, 16-, and 8-bit registers. Finally, the bottom REGx level appends a unique index






Figure 15: Normalization Hierarchy for Registers
Figure 16 illustrates the normalized tokens for diﬀerent registers based on the
hierarchy.
Figure 16: Register Normalization Example
Figures 17 and 18 show the normalized versions of sub 76641161 and sub 7664133B.
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Figure 17: Normalized sub 76641161
Figure 18: Normalized sub 7664133B
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4.2 Clone Detector / Searcher
The clone detector / searcher consists of four steps. The ﬁrst step is to partition each
function into an array of regions. The second and third steps are to identify the exact
and inexact clones, respectively, among the regions created in the ﬁrst step. Finally,
the fourth step is to search a speciﬁc target code fragment through a repository of
assembly ﬁles.
4.2.1 Regionizer
Each function is partitioned into an array of overlapping regions using a sliding win-
dow with a size of at most w statements and a step size s, where w and s are
user-speciﬁed thresholds. Figure 19 shows the extracted regions of the normalized
procedure sub 76641161 in Figure 17 with w = 15 and s = 1. Setting s = 1 ensures
that no regions will be skipped, i.e., no clones will be missed.
Figure 19: Regionization for w = 15 and s = 1
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4.2.2 Exact Clone Detector
As mentioned in Deﬁnitions 3.0.1 and 3.0.2. A clone pair is deﬁned as an unordered
pair of code regions that have similar normalized statements. A clone cluster is a
group of clone pairs. This step identiﬁes the exact clone pairs among the regions by
comparing their assembly code instructions. Two regions are considered as an exact
clone pair if all the normalized statements in the two regions are identical. A naive
approach to identify the exact clone pairs is to compare every pair of regions. Yet,
this approach is too computationally expensive with complexity of O(n2), where n is
the total number of regions. Thus, a hashing approach was employed. Speciﬁcally,
two regions are considered as an exact clone pair if they share the same hash value.
As this approach uses a hash algorithm to map each region to an integer value, all
identical regions are mapped to the same bucket without false positives and false
negatives. The process requires only one scan on the identiﬁed regions.
Algorithm 1 provides the details of the method. First, an empty hash table H is
initialized. Each entry in the hash table contains a hash value v with a corresponding
array of regions having such a hash value. In Lines 4-6, the method iterates through
each region r, creates a hash value v, and adds the region r to the corresponding
array H(v). Each entry H(v) contains an exact clone cluster. In Lines 7-9, the
method iterates through each clone cluster and constructs an array of exact clone
pairs denoted by EC.
4.2.3 Inexact Clone Detector
The objective of the inexact clone detector is to identify the inexact clone pairs from a
given collection of regions. The detector ﬁrst extracts some features from each region,
constructs a feature vector, and then groups the feature vectors by similarity. Two
regions are considered as an inexact clone pair if the similarity between their feature
vectors is within a user-speciﬁed minimum similarity threshold.
The feature vectors are constructed based on ﬁve groups of features from the
assembly instructions [50]. The ﬁrst group of features includes all mnemonics. In
other words, each distinct mnemonic forms a feature. The second group covers all
operand types. The third group includes all combinations of mnemonics and the
type of the ﬁrst operand. The fourth group includes all combinations of the ﬁrst two
operands. Finally, the last group includes maxOperands number of distinct operands
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Algorithm 1: Exact Clone Detector
input : set of regions R




foreach region r ∈ R do
v ← hash(r);
H(v) ← H(v) ∪ {r};
foreach H(v) ∈ H do
for i = 0 → |H(v)| do
for j = i+ 1 → |H(v)| do
EC ← EC ∪ {(ri, rj)};
return EC;
found in the code, where maxOperands ≥ 0 is a user-speciﬁed threshold.
In this section, two inexact clone detection methods that iteratively improve the
accuracy of clone detection are proposed in ﬁve steps.
Sliding Window Inexact Detection
Algorithm 2 provides an overview of the sliding window inexact detection method.
1. Compute medians: This step computes the median of each feature. The
medians serve as a point of division for grouping the feature vectors in the
subsequent steps. The feature values, however, may have a very large range.
Therefore, the medians are computed to avoid the negative impact of outliers.
2. Filter out features: This step ﬁlters out the features that have their median
equal to 0. The rationale is that some features may appear only once or a
few times in all extracted regions, implying that they are unimportant for the
purpose of region comparison. Thus, removing the features with a median of
zero can improve the accuracy and eﬃciency of the inexact clone detection
method.
3. Generate binary vectors: This step constructs a binary vector for each region
by comparing the feature vector of the region with the median vector. If a
feature value is larger than the corresponding median, then 1 is inserted into
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the entry of the binary vector. Otherwise, 0 is inserted.
4. Partition into sub-vectors: The fourth step is to partition each binary vector
into a sequence of sub-vectors using a sliding window of size SBSize.
5. Hash sub-vectors: Given that the size of each sub-vector is SBSize, there
are 2SBSize possible combinations of binary values. For each sub-vector, a hash
with 2SBSize number of buckets is created to store the regions having the same
sub-vector values. The regions are hashed by computing the decimal number
of the sub-vector values. The inexact clone pairs are identiﬁed in this step
by keeping track of the frequency of region co-occurrences in all inexact hash
tables’ buckets. The region pairs with the number of co-occurrences above or
equal to the similarity threshold minS are considered as inexact clone pairs.
Example 2 Figure 20 shows a collection of features generated from a dataset after
the ﬁltering process. For simplicity, just a small set of features are shown here. The
dashed rectangles show the sub-vectors of the feature vector with a user-deﬁned sub-
vector of size 5. There are n − 5 + 1 sub-vectors for n extracted features after the
ﬁltering process and 25 = 32 possible hash values (decimal numbers) for each sub-
vector that makes the size of each associated inexact hash table 32. Step 5 maps
the regions into these hash tables by computing the decimal number of their binary
vectors.
Figure 20: Step 3 - Sliding Window Inexact Detection Method with SBSize = 5
Two-Combination Inexact Detection
This method follows the same general steps, but the detailed process in step 3 is diﬀer-
ent. Instead of creating sub-vectors with the user-deﬁned length sliding windows, all
possible two-combination of the remaining features after the ﬁltering process are con-
structed. Each two-combination vector acts as a sub-vector. Then, each feature vector
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Algorithm 2: Inexact Clone Detector: Sliding Window Method
input : set of regions R
set of features F
similarity threshold minS
output: set of inexact clone pairs IC
begin
SBSize ← sub− vectors′size; Binary ← ∅;
Hk ← ∅;
M ← ComputeMedians(F ); /* Step1 */
foreach m ∈ M do /* Step2 */
if m = 0 then
M ← M −m;
foreach r ∈ R do /* Step3 */
for k = 0 → length(M) do




foreach r ∈ R do /* Step4 */
for i = 0 → length(Binary)− SBSize+ 1 do
for j = 0 → SBSize do
sub− vectori[j] ← Binary[i+ j];
foreach r ∈ R do /* Step5 */
foreach k = 0 → Numberofsub− vectors do
Hk ← Compute the decimal number;
R′ ← ﬁnd other regions with the same hash value
foreach r′ ∈ R′ do
if r and r′ occurred more than the minS threshold then
IC ← IC ∪ {(r, r′)};
return IC;
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is mapped into its sub-vectors. Sub-vectors have the same size as two-combination
which is equal to 2. In this case, the user does not have the ﬂexibility to choose the
size of sub-vectors.
Example 3 Figure 21 shows all possible two-combinations of the features in Fig-
ure 20, each of which is a sub-vector. Let n be the number of features after the
ﬁltering process. There are C(n, 2) = n×(n−1)
2
sub-vectors. Given that each sub-
vector is a binary vector of size 2, there are 22 = 4 possible hash values, implying
that each inexact hash table contains 4 entries. This method maps the regions into














































Figure 21: Step 3 - Two-Combination Inexact Detection Method
The two proposed inexact detection methods generate diﬀerent numbers of sub-
vectors and diﬀerent sub-vector sizes. These characteristics aﬀect the eﬃciency and
scalability of the program.
The sliding window method considers only the sub-vectors with consecutive fea-
tures, while the two-combination method considers all possible two combinations.
Therefore, the set of sub-vectors generated by the sliding window method is a subset
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of the sub-vectors generated by the two-combination method. As a result, the slid-
ing window method performs better than the two-combination method in terms of
scalability, but the two-combination method performs better in terms of recall rate.
Experimental results also support this observation.
Comparing with LSH Approach
Sæbjørnsen et al. [50] presented an inexact clone detection method to identify inexact
clone pairs by using the locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) to ﬁnd the nearest neighbor
vectors of a given query vector. Their assumption on uniform distribution of vectors
in LSH method aﬀects the number of false-negative errors, i.e., the recall rate. LSH
consists of m hash functions. Each hash function hi maps a vector v to a binary
vector by computing the dot product of v and a base vector bi. If the computed
result is negative, the vector will be mapped to 0. Otherwise, it will map to 1. The
base vector and vector v must share the same size. Using these parameters, the LSH
value lsh(v) of a vector v is deﬁned as the following equation:
lsh(v) = (h1(v), h2(v), . . . , hm(v)) (1)
In brief, the LSH method splits a vector space into 2m sub-spaces by m base vectors.
These base vectors are chosen randomly and the distribution of vectors are not con-
sidered. If the distribution of vectors is lopsided, then LSH cannot split the vector
space eﬃciently, resulting in incorrect subspace assignment for some vectors. The
accuracy of ﬁnding the nearest neighbor problem using LSH depends on parameters
selection which is challenging in large dimension feature vectors. Also, due to the em-
ployment of randomization, the clone results produced by LSH are non-deterministic.
Some malware analysts clearly indicate that this non-deterministic behaviour is un-
acceptable, as it will be very diﬃcult for the reverse engineers to produce a consistent
analysis on malware. To avoid the non-deterministic behaviour as in LSH, the pro-
posed methods employ ﬁxed parameters derived from the data. The ﬁrst one is the




Given a target code fragment, the Clone Searcher module uses the previously de-
scribed detection methods to search for the exact and inexact matching clones in a
collection of previously analyzed assembly ﬁles.
4.3 Post-Processing
4.3.1 Duplicate Clone Merger
The inexact clone detector may misclassify two consecutive regions to be a clone.
This step is to remove the clones that are highly overlapping consecutive regions.
This happens when the stride s is smaller than the windows size w. A user-speciﬁed
maximum overlapping thresholdmaxO is deﬁned that indicates the fraction of allowed
overlapped instructions of two consecutive regions which can still be considered as a
clone pair.
Example 4 Figure 22 provides an example for this step. It shows two consecutive
regions with a window of size 10 and an overlapping ratio of 0.6. SupposemaxO = 0.5.
Since the overlapping ratio is above maxO, the clone pair is discarded.
Figure 22: Duplicate Clone Merger with w = 10, s = 4, and an Overlapped Size of
0.6
4.3.2 Maximal Clone Merger
Since the clone detection processes operate on regions, the size of the identiﬁed clones
is bounded by the window size w. As a result, a natural large clone fragment may
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be broken down into small, consecutive cloned regions, making the analysis diﬃcult.
The objective of this step is to merge the smaller consecutive clone regions into a
larger clone. All identiﬁed clone fragments are then stored in the user-speciﬁed XML
ﬁle.
Algorithm 3 provides the maximal clone merger design where CP is the set of
identiﬁed clone pairs and MC is the set of maximal merged clone pairs after the
merging process. The overlap function ﬁnds the overlapped clones in lines 4-5. Sup-
pose clone pairs c and c′ are a pair of regions {A,B} and {A′, B′} respectively. Two
clones are overlapped if each of their regions shares some instructions. Hence, c and
c′ are overlapped cloned pairs if {A,A′} and {B,B′} have overlapped instructions.
Algorithm 3: Maximal Clone Merger
input : set of clone pairs CP
output: set of maximal merged clone pairs MC
begin
MC ← ∅;
foreach clone pair c and c′ ∈ CP do
if overlap(region A ∈ c, region A′ ∈ c′) & overlap(region B
∈ c, region B′ ∈ c′) then
CP ← merge(c, c′);
MC ← CP ;
return MC;
Example 5 Figure 23 provides an example on the maximal clone merge. With win-
dow size w = 5, every region in lines 50 - 60 on the left corresponds to a region in
lines 105 - 115 on the right, represented by 6 clone pairs. Since all 6 clone pairs are
consecutive, they are merged into one clone pair as indicated by the dashed rectan-
gles.
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Figure 23: Maximal Clone Merger with w = 5 and s = 1
4.4 XML Output
The clone detection results are stored in an XML ﬁle. The XML ﬁle contains four
nodes, namely parameters, assembly ﬁles, clone ﬁles, and token references. Refer to
Figure 24 as an example.
Figure 24: Sample XML File
• The parameters node stores the user-speciﬁed parameters, such as the window
size w, step size s, minimal similarity threshold minS, maximal overlapping
thresholdmaxO, normalization level and maximum number of distinct operands
maxOperands.
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Figure 25: Sample XML File (parameters)
• The assembly ﬁles node stores a list of assembly ﬁles. The primary objective is
to assign a unique ﬁleID to each assembly ﬁle for subsequent references. Some
basic statistics, such as the number of functions and the number of regions
found, are also stored in the corresponding node. Refer to Figure 26 as an
example.
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Figure 26: Sample XML File (assembly ﬁles)
• The clone ﬁles node stores the clone search results. Speciﬁcally, the clones ﬁles
node stores a list of clone ﬁles, in which each clone ﬁle stores a list of clone pairs.
Each clone pair stores the location references for the clone pair. For example,
Figure 27 contains 8 pairs of clone ﬁles. File with ﬁleID = 5 and File with
ﬁleID = 1 share 4 clone pairs. The ﬁrst entry, for example, indicates that lines
3-7 in ﬁleID = 5 is a clone of lines 600-604 in ﬁleID = 1.
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Figure 27: Sample XML File (clone ﬁles)
• The token references node stores the token search results. Speciﬁcally, the
token references node stores three lists of tokens, namely constants, strings,
and imports. For example, Figure 28 contains 97 tokens. Speciﬁcally, the string
token PackedCatalogItem appears twice in line 388 and line 504 in ﬁle with
ﬁleID = 4.
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Figure 28: Sample XML File (token references)
4.5 Visualizer
A graphical user interface (GUI) has been implemented to allow the user to input the
required parameters, read the user-speciﬁed target code fragment or target tokens,
and interactively identify the matched clone fragments or tokens from the assembly
ﬁles. First, the user has to specify the set of parameters as shown in Figure 29
and Figure 30. This set consists of assembly folder path, XML report destination
path, window size, step size, maximal overlapping thresholdmaxO, minimal similarity
minS,maxOperands, register normalization level, choice of inexact detection method,
and sub-vector size, if the inexact detection is checked as sliding window method.
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Figure 29: Clone Detection (Input Parameters)
Figure 30: Clone Search
In this particular example, the program parses the assembly ﬁles form Assembly
folder path and stores the clone results in clonepairs04.xml, which shows all the clone
ﬁles in Figure 31.
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Figure 31: GUI (Clone File Pairs Found)
Next, the user clicks on a pair of clone ﬁles, say the second one with rpclts3.asm
and sccbase.asm. Then, a list of clone pairs in these two ﬁles is shown in Figure 32.
The cloned fragments in the two ﬁles are then highlighted in red.




The objective of the empirical study is to evaluate the proposed assembly code clone
detection method in terms of accuracy, eﬃciency, and scalability. All experiments
were performed on an Intel Xeon X5460 3.16 GHz Quad-Core processor-based server
with 48GB of RAM running Windows Server 2003.
The experiments were conducted on three sets of binary ﬁles. The ﬁrst dataset
is an assortment of DLL ﬁles from an Operating System converted into 18 assembly
ﬁles by IDA Pro [2]. The second dataset contains two well-known malware, Zeus
and Blaster. Zeus is a trojan horse that extracts banking information using man-in-
the-browser keystroke logging and form grabbing. Blaster is a computer worm that
spreads by exploiting a buﬀer overﬂow on computers running Microsoft Windows
simply by spamming itself to large numbers of random IP addresses. Table 2 shows
some basic information on the two malware disassembled by IDA Pro [2]. The third
dataset is an assortment of 70 malware obtained from the NNational Cyber-Forensics
and Training Alliance (NCFTA) Canada [5]. The ﬁles were disassembled using IDA
Pro [2]. The total size of these ﬁle these are more than 10 MB.
Name Type Size # of Functions # of LOC
Zeus Trojan Horse 9 MB 45954 594153
Blaster Worm 70 KB 13 2642
Table 2: Malware Speciﬁcations
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5.1 Accuracy
To evaluate the accuracy of the proposed clone detection methods, some code frag-
ments were ﬁrst selected from the 18 assembly ﬁles. Then, clones of the code frag-
ments were manually identiﬁed in the assembly ﬁles. Finally, the detection results of
the proposed system were compared with the manually identiﬁed clones in order to











where Solution is the set of manually identiﬁed clone fragments, Result is the set of
code fragments in a clone detection result, and nij is the number of code fragments in
both Solution and Result. Intuitively, F(Solution, Result) measures the quality of the
clone detection Result with respect to the Solution by the harmonic mean of Recall
and Precision. As the goal is to evaluate the quality of the results with respect to a
manually identiﬁed solution, it is infeasible to perform the evaluation in this manner
on an extremely large collection of assembly ﬁles.
For the assortment of DLL ﬁles, Figure 33 shows the precision, recall, and F-score
for step size s = 1, maximum number of distinct features maxOperands = 40, min-
imum similarity threshold minS = 0.5 and minS = 0.8. The value of s is chosen to
be one to consider all possible regions in the datasets. Both the sliding window and
the two-combination inexact detection methods are evaluated. Experimental results
show a better precision for sliding window inexact detection when compared with the
two-combination method. By considering the fact that sliding window inexact detec-
tion has less number of sub-vectors, Figure 33 implies that a higher number of inexact
sub-vectors increases the number of false positives. In contrast, the two-combination
method yields a higher recall rate due to the reason explained in Section 4.2.3. The
precision and F-score are consistently above 75% for both inexact detection methods.
The recall is above 80% for the sliding window and 100% for the two-combination
method, suggesting that the clone detection methods are eﬀective.
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Figure 33: Accuracy (DLL ﬁles) with s = 1 and maxOperands = 40
To evaluate the precision of the second dataset (Zeus and Blaster), the ﬁrst 10
regions were selected from each of the malware. For each selected region, the proposed
clone detection methods were used to search for its clones in the rest of the code.
Then, each of the identiﬁed clone in the result was manually examined in order to
compute the precision. With step size s = 1, maximum number of distinct features
maxOperands = 40, minimum similarity threshold minS = 0.8, and window size w
ranging from 20 to 80, the precision consistently stayed above 90%, suggesting that
the proposed methods are eﬀective in identifying clones in malware.
Window Size: 20 40 60 80
# of Exact Clones 18010 17225 17162 16971
# of Inexact Clones (SW) 266335 272008 274346 759953
# of Inexact Clones (TC) 285132 441575 736396 1053801
Table 3: Number of Clones (Malware Assortment)
The number of exact and inexact clones identiﬁed by the proposed methods in
the third dataset (malware collection) was also evaluated for diﬀerent window sizes
for both the sliding window and two-combination inexact detection methods. Table 3
shows that there is a large number of exact and inexact clones in malware. The result
suggests that malware programmers share many codes at both regional and functional
levels. Also, the experimental results suggest that the two-combination method (TC)
can identify more clones than the sliding window method.
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5.2 Eﬃciency
Figure 34 depicts the runtime for both exact and inexact clone detection methods
for a window size ranging from 20 to 80 for the malware assortment dataset. The
process took 26 to 30 seconds in total when the sliding window inexact clone detection
method is used and 41 to 68 seconds in total for the two-combination inexact clone
detection. In general, the runtime decreases as the window size increases, because
fewer number of regions results in fewer number of clones.
Figure 34: Runtime vs. Window Size (Malware Assortment)
5.3 Scalability
Figure 36 illustrates the runtime, in seconds, of each step for 10 to 70 malware ﬁles
with window size w = 40, step size s = 1, maximum number of distinct features
maxOperands = 40, and minimum similarity threshold minS = 0.8, for the two-
combination inexact detection method. The total processing time for the sample
malware assortment ranges from 35 to 980 seconds. Figure 35 shows the runtime
using the same dataset and settings for the sliding window inexact detection method.
In this case, the total processing time ranges from 8 to 258 seconds. As mentioned in
Section 4.2.3, the sliding window inexact clone detection method performs better in
terms of scalability, as it has fewer number of inexact sub-vectors.
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Figure 35: Scalability (with Sliding Window)
Figure 36: Scalability (with Two-Combination)
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis, we reviewed the source code clone detection techniques as well as
the feasibility of applying them to assembly code clone detection. Then, a metric-
based assembly code clone detection system was presented with novel ideas capable
of ﬁnding both exact and inexact clones. To evaluate the system, a comprehensive
experiment was conducted on real-life binary ﬁles obtained from an Operating System
and malware obtained from NCFTA Canada [5]. Experimental results suggest that
the implemented system can eﬀectively identify exact and inexact clones in assembly
code.
The contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows. First, two eﬃcient
and eﬀective inexact clone detection method capable of ﬁnding type III clones are
proposed. Experimental results suggest that the two-combination inexact detection
method can eliminate all false negatives. Second, unlike the LSH approach employed
in Sæbjørnsen et al.’s work [50], our proposed clone detection methods are determin-
istic, which is an important property for malware analysis as speciﬁed by analysts.
Third, a ﬂexible normalization scheme is implemented to normalize assembly instruc-
tion so that clone detection can be performed at diﬀerent levels depending on the
purpose of clone detection to ﬁnd type I and type II clones. Fourth, the capability
of searching code fragments through a code repository is added. Finally, a graphical
user interface is implemented to let users browse the identiﬁed clones.
The current implementation is a prototype system that evaluates the feasibility of
assembly code clone detection. The system can be further improved in the following
two directions.
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1. Inexact clone detection: Though the currently implemented inexact clone detec-
tion produces reasonably high-quality results, the quality of the clone detection
process is sensitive to the user-speciﬁed parameters. One potential improvement
is to replace the hash-based approach by a cluster-based data mining approach.
2. Scalable implementation: In the current implementation, all computations are
performed in memory. To build a real-life clone detection system, the one must
develop a disk-resident version of the algorithm that stores the feature vectors
into a database, instead of regenerating the feature vectors every time.
Most of the works in the literature, including the method implemented in this
thesis, focus on identifying syntactic clones. Yet, a real research challenge is to iden-
tify the semantic clones that are syntactically diﬀerent. This remains a challenging
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